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 5 
Introduction 
 In 2004, a French law went into effect banning girls in state sponsored schools 
from wearing the hijab, a Muslim head covering. While the law also banned the Jewish 
kippa and large cross necklaces from being worn in public schools, the hijab took center 
stage in what became a worldwide media frenzy. Headlines from around the world 
including San Francisco1, London2, Melbourne3 and Chennai4 reported on this law and 
the public outcry that followed. This law along with the ban on face veils commonly 
called burqas or niqabs, which went into effect in April 2011 ignited internal tensions in 
France and showed deep divides within the French populace. Not only did these 
controversial laws cause a media frenzy, they also revealed a country that is in danger of 
betraying its historical revolutionary values of liberty, fraternity and equality. 
 What exactly is the hijab and why did it ignite such tension and controversy not 
only in France but also across the globe? The hijab is a form of female Muslim dress. It is 
commonly called a headscarf and in France is known as a foulard. It should not be 
confused with the burqa or niqab which are forms of Muslim dress that covers a woman’s 
entire body except for her eyes. Both are frequently associated with terrorism, Islamic 
fundamentalism and the oppression of women in the Middle East. While the Qur’an does 
not specifically state that women must veil, there are several verses that many interpret as 
evidence for veiling being required of pious Muslim women. However, none of the 
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verses specifically say that women must veil but state that men and women must dress 
modestly. Several of these verses only apply to the women who were the Prophet 
Mohammad’s wives.5 How then has this become a worldwide symbol of the oppression 
of Muslim women? 
 One way to determine whether France is indeed betraying its revolutionary values 
is to take a closer look at French nationalism. According to nationalist theorist Liah 
Greenfeld, France has a hybrid form of nationalism, a mix of collectivist and civic 
nationalism.6 Greenfeld writes, “Collectivistic nationalisms tend to be authoritarian and 
imply a fundamental inequality between a small group of self-appointed interpreters of 
the will of the nation-the leaders-and the masses, who have to adapt to the elite’s 
interpretations. Collectivistic nationalism thus favor the political culture of populist 
democracy or socialism, and as such furnish the ideological bases of modern tyrannies.”7 
Civic nationalism is based on the individual rights and freedoms of the citizens, who are 
all treated as equals.8 It is clear that these two forms of nationalism are quite 
contradictory and thus lead to confusions in countries like France that tend to espouse 
both ideas, “The civic criteria of national membership acknowledge the freedom of the 
individual members, which the collectivistic definition of the nation denies. Collectivistic 
and civic nationalism is therefore an ambivalent, problematic type, necessarily plagued 
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by internal contradictions.”9 This begins to explain why the law banning the hijab in 
public schools in France has created such a media firestorm and seemingly contradict the 
French values of liberty, equality and fraternity.  
 The law that banned the hijab and several laws the came about in the years 
following the hijab ban illustrate that France is moving away from its civic nationalism 
and slowly adopting an ethnic nationalism. By passing a law that outwardly calls a 
religious form of dress unacceptable in public schools, the French are insinuating that this 
dress has no place in their society. This paper will examine the law banning the hijab and 
the reactions that ensued. The first chapter will provide a detailed review of the Stasi 
commission, which was charged with investigating controversy over the hijab in public 
schools and provide an overview of the law concerning conspicuous religious items in 
public schools. Actual texts of the law will be examined and explained along with 
possible and planned interpretations. Additionally, the fines and punishments associated 
with this law will be assessed. The second chapter will focus on the politics and public 
reaction associated with the law and, in particular, the rightwing French political party 
the National Front and its role in the ban will be looked at. French public reaction will 
also be examined. This will be especially interesting because of the post 9/11 climate in 
which these laws were introduced. Finally, the conclusion will examine the significance 
of France’s departure from its revolutionary values, how this ban will affect French 
nationalism and implications of the laws including crime, inequality, nativism and the 
possible growth of radical Islam in France.  
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 These values originated during the French Revolution. They represent the ideals 
the revolutionaries wanted their country to achieve. The phrase “Liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, was the motto of the French Republic first spoken by Antoine-Francois 
Momoro.10  This motto was one of many during the period of the revolution but during 
the Third Republic, became institutionalized as the official motto of France.11 
 Along with the three revolutionary values, there is the idea of laicité, which 
literally translated means secularism. This idea of state sponsored secularism was a key 
part of the arguments supporting the ban of the hijab and those opposing its passage. 
Laicité first appeared in France in 1905 when the Law of Separation between Church and 
State came into effect and read, “Article 1. The Republic ensures freedom of conscience. 
It guarantees the free exercise of religions. Article 2. It neither recognizes nor subsidizes 
any religion.”12 In the constitutional revisions of 1905 the principle of laicité became an 
unwritten virtual constitutional ideal and was mentioned in the 1946 Constitution.13 
Laicité has had a profound effect on the concept of secularism in France. While the 
United States has the separation of Church and State as part of its government structure, 
French laicité is different and more deeply entrenched in the French political system, 
“Because secularism is a characteristic of the state, one can say that freedoms are better 
guaranteed if the state is secular. The state’s secular duty is an obligation to which a 
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subjective right does not correspond. It is, therefore, to be treated not as a civil right, but 
as a public freedom.”14  
In regards to the headscarf ban in French public schools, there are two ways in 
which laicité can be interpreted. The first is that the hijab is a symbol of fundamentalist 
and extremist Islam and the concept of state secularism necessitated this ban from public 
schools because they are seen as religious propaganda and advocated against tolerance 
and equality of the sexes.15 The second interpretation is that because of state secularism, 
only the state, not the students, are required to remain neutral on issues of religion and 
religious expression, it follows that the state banning the hijab because the state views it 
as oppressive towards women is not allowed because that requires the state to take a 
stance on Islam which would violate its neutrality.16 Laicité, its place in the French state 
and its application are confusing and open to a variety of different interpretations. 
Therefore, it is easy to see why this concept played such a large role in the debates 
leading up to the hijab ban.  
 In any discussion concerning Muslims in France, it is important to look at the 
colonial history France has with North Africa. From 1830 when France first conquered 
Algeria and 1962 when the Algerian War ended, France had a very established presence 
in its colonies in Algeria and Morocco.17 French history in this region was at no point 
calm or peaceful. It was during France’s colonization in the region that the French view 
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of Muslims was established. France viewed Algerians in a hierarchal sense, “In the 
hierarchy of social distinction, Jews ranked below Christian Europeans and ‘native’ 
French, but above the Muslims (Arab and Berber) who were the real subject peoples, 
those with no vote or right to representation.”18 Muslims were thought to be somehow 
less human and more barbaric than their European Christian counterparts. French 
statesmen François Guizot, in 1846, likened the Arabs to natives that were found when 
India and the Americas were colonized, “one is faced with ‘people who are half savages,’ 
accustomed to ‘devastation’ and ‘murder,’ and therefore ‘one is obliged to employ more 
violent and sometimes harsher methods than those who command the soldiers are 
naturally incline to use.’”19  
When these “savages” emigrated from the French North African colonies to 
France, they did not find a very welcoming environment. In 1914, when Algerians were 
allowed to legally emigrate to France (Moroccans and Tunisians were not given this right 
and began arriving illegally), large numbers of poor peasant men began pouring into 
France, “The presence of North Africans in the cities of the metropole, and the conditions 
under which they lived and worked, had the effect of exacerbating differences.”20 The 
conditions in which these newly arrived immigrants lived was absolutely horrid, “The 
men lived in cramped housing, clustered in neighborhoods that quickly were associated 
with high levels of prostitution, homosexuality, and crime.”21  They quickly became 
associated with criminals, the French daily newspaper Le Matin wrote in 1923, “The 
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crimes and offences committed by Arabs are increasing…almost all the rabble which 
infests us is foreign.”22 It is almost eerie how Le Matin’s commentary is so similar to the 
current rhetoric of the National Front. With such a difficult past, the present day relations 
between Muslim immigrants and French society is not at all surprising and this 
relationship helps provide context for the ban of the hijab and similar laws.  
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Chapter One 
 
Not Just a Post 9/11 Issue 
 The turmoil surrounding the Muslim headscarf or hijab in French public schools 
began almost fifteen years before the current legislation regarding religious symbols in 
schools was brought to the table. On October 3, 1989 the affaires des foulards began. It 
all started at a middle school in the town of Creil, a suburb located just outside of Paris. 
Three girls were expelled for refusing to remove their hijabs at school.1 The particular 
school these girls attended was located in a ZEP or priority educational zone; a term 
designated for high poverty areas that were ethnically diverse and tended to have a high 
turnover among the teaching staff.2 The expulsion prompted widespread debate 
throughout France about the legality of wearing hijabs in French public schools, which 
are supposed to be far removed from all things religious. The Creil incident provoked 
huge coverage in the French press and spoke to the underlying tensions between the 
French and an increasingly large immigrant population, “On the face of it, the hubbub 
generated by the press seems exaggerated, but in fact it exposed the crisis the nation was 
confronting: how to reconcile an increasingly multicultural population with a 
universalism that precluded the recognition of cultural and social differences.”3 The 
purpose of this chapter is to explore why a law was implemented in France banning the 
wearing of the hijab and other conspicuous religious items in public schools. In order to 
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do this, incidents involving the hijab in public schools from the late 1980s through the 
mid 1990s will be examined. Then the creation and composition of the Stasi Commission 
will be explained and their final report will be evaluated. Finally, the law created in 
response to the Stasi Commission’s report and its implementation will be inspected. 
While individual party politics and public opinion played a role in the Stasi Commission, 
its report and the law that came as a result, they will not be examined in this chapter; 
instead they will be the focus of Chapter 2 which covers the politics and public reaction 
surround the hijab ban.    
 As a result of the incident in Creil the minister of Education requested a legal 
analysis of whether school administrators could force students to remove religious 
symbols under the concept of laicité. This fell into the purview of the Conseil d’Etat or 
Council of the State, which is the highest administrative court in France and is tasked 
with dealing with the legality of actions taken by public bodies4. The council ruled on the 
issue at the end of November 1989. “On November 27, the council ruled that the wearing 
of signs of religious affiliation by students in public schools was not necessarily 
incompatible with the principle of laicité, as long as these signs were not ostentatious or 
polemical, and didn’t constitute “acts of pressure, provocation, proselytism or 
propaganda” that interfered with the liberties of other students. Students could not be 
refused admission to school for simply wearing headscarves; this would be a violation of 
the right to individual conscience, which included religious conviction.”5 While the 
Council ruled in favor of the three girls who had been expelled and upheld their right to 
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wear their headscarves in class, it would not be the last time this issue would be 
challenged in the media, French politics and in court.  
 Throughout the early to mid 1990s several challenges were made to the 1989 
Conseil d’Etat ruling. By 1994, forty-nine legal disputes involving girls wearing 
headscarves reached the council and forty-one of those disputes were decided, in favor of 
the schoolgirl. When the ruling favored the school it normally involved a girl who was 
constantly absent or involved in proselytism.6  Despite all the legal cases, major attention 
was not brought to the issue until 2003 with the creation of the Stasi Commission. The 
commission was created despite the fact that teacher complaints about hijabs in their 
classrooms had dropped from 300 in 1994 to 150 in 2003.7 
 
The Stasi Commission 
 Besides the events discussed above there were no major developments 
surrounding the headscarf controversy until the creation of the Stasi Commission by 
French President Jacques Chirac on July 3, 2003. Bernard Stasi headed the commission 
and although commonly referred to as the Stasi Commission, the full name was, The 
Commission to Reflect on the Application of the Principle of Secularism in the 
Republic.8 Stasi, at the time, was the ombudsman for France but had served in many 
different political roles including minister for overseas departments and territories (1973-
                                                        
6
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74), vice president of the National Assembly (1978-83) and a member of the European 
Parliament (1994-98).9 In total the commission had twenty members that included, “high-
ranking academics, scholars specializing in the Muslim world and issues of race, 
immigration, and ‘integration’ in France, specialists on laicité, members of the Haut 
Conseil à l’Intégration, intellectuals, political figures, a management consultant and a 
high school principal.”10 According to Bronwyn Winter, an associate professor of French 
studies at the University of Sydney, the purpose of the commission was, “not to debate 
the desirability of French secularism, as it was already firmly established in law and in 
the constitution, but to debate its application in the contemporary context.”11  
 Over the course of the commission, members listened to submissions from 
approximately 140 individuals and organizations. One hundred of these submissions were 
made available to the public.12 The submissions came from a wide spectrum of the 
French public and French organizations. Political submissions came from a variety of 
French political parties including the right-wing National Front as well as a number of 
trade unions.13  In the realm of religious submissions, Dalil Boubaker the pro-secular 
Rector of the Paris Mosque and the president of the French Council for the Muslim Faith, 
conservative Catholic Archbishop Lustiger and representatives from the Protestant, 
Jewish, Greek Orthodox, Hindu, Buddhist, and Baha’i faiths all submitted their opinions 
to the commission.14 High school principles, women’s groups, antiracism organizations, 
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prison and hospital directors, company directors, academics, the editor-in-chief of Le 
Monde Diplomatique and prominent feminists all took part as well.15 One group 
noticeably missing from these submissions is adolescent Muslim girls, both those who 
wore hijab and those who did not. The very group whose actions the commission was 
charged with evaluating in relation to laicité had their opinions and viewpoints 
completely excluded. How then could the commission expect to accurately investigate 
the task prescribed to them by the French president when they did not involve the group 
that their findings would most directly affect?  
 
The Stasi Commission Report 
 On December 11, 2003 the Committee of Reflection on the Application of the 
Principle of Secularity in the Republic headed by Bernard Stasi sent President Jacques 
Chirac their final report. The report focuses on secularity in all aspects of life in the 
republic but for this paper I will only look at their findings in relation to public schools. 
According to the report, the commission interviewed students from several different high 
schools. Most of these schools were French schools located in other countries like Turkey, 
the Czech Republic and Austria. Of the two high schools located in France that the 
commission examined, both were located in the Seine-et-Marne region.16 This is a 
suburban area located to the east of Paris. While students at these high schools might 
have been Muslim girls who wear the hijab, there is no way of knowing since the report 
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never specifies if it spoke to girls wearing the hijab or asked them why they wear the 
hijab.  
 In a letter to Chirac at the beginning of the report, Bernard Stasi acknowledges 
that situations in the Middle East did play a role in the commission’s findings and 
suggestions. “The international situation, and particularly the conflict of the Near East, 
contribute also to worsen tension and to provoke clashes in certain of our cities. In that 
context, it is natural that many of our countrymen call for the restoration of national 
control, particularly in the schools. Taking account of these threats and considering the 
values of our Republic which require respect, we formulated the suggestions that figure 
in this report and that we present to you.”17 This admission shows that the world post 
9/11 does have an impact on French views regarding Islam. It also shows why after 
several years of a lull in regards to the hijab in schools that this issue was brought again 
to national attention in 2003 with the creation of the Stasi Commission.  
 A large part of the report is dedicated to reviewing the history of the 1905 laicité 
law. In particular importance to the future law that banned hijabs in public schools is the 
mention of the importance of schools when it comes to laicité in the republic. “This 
requirement initially applies to schools. The pupils must work in a calm climate to pursue 
their studies and ultimately to form independent judgment. The state must oppose their 
spirits being plagues by the violence and passions of society: without being a sterile 
chamber, the school cannot become an echo chamber for the passions of the world, under 
pain of failing in its educational mission.”18 This clearly shows the importance both the 
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commission and the French state put on secularity in schools and helps explains the 
findings that the commission lays out at the end of the report.  
 When the report moves to discussing past incidences involving religious 
paraphernalia in schools, it begins with the 1989 incident in Creil and the subsequent 
ruling by the Conseil d’Etat where the incident was argued. During this time the council 
ruled that students were allowed to wear certain religious items as long as they did not 
violate four specific principles. “1. Coercive acts, provocations, proselytization, and 
propaganda are prohibited; 2. Acts which question the dignity, pluralism, or the liberty of 
pupils or any member of the education community, as well as any that compromise their 
peace of mind or safety, are rejected; 3. All disruption of educational activities, of the 
educational role of lessons and everything troubling order in the establishment or the 
function of normal service; 4. The necessary missions of public service in education and 
especially the content of the educational program cannot be affected by the behavior of 
students.”19 While the council did put certain restrictions on the wearing of religious 
items in schools, they still upheld the students right to wear them. Yet despite these 
protections granted by the Conseil d’Etat, the highest institution of law in France, the 
commission was reexamining this issue again. The commission even explicitly says that 
they believe religious paraphernalia to be detrimental to students’ learning environment, 
“In the schools, wearing an ostensibly religious symbol–a large cross, yarmulke, or veil–
suffices to disrupt the tranquility of the studious life.”20   
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 Among the reasons the commission gives that religious symbols are not 
appropriate in French public schools is the hijab represents the degradation of young 
women. The commission reported that: “Young women find themselves again victims of 
a resurgence of sexism which is produced by various pressures and by verbal, 
psychological, or physical violence. Young men force them to wear clothes that are 
concealing and asexual, to lower their eyes on seeing a man; with failure to conform, they 
are stigmatized as “whores.” Many associations are alarmed by the more and more 
frequent withdrawal of their female members who were born abroad, whose environment 
forbids them to engage in community life.”21 The report goes on to say that whether or 
not these girls wear the hijab on their own volition or because they are forced once they 
do so they are protected from taunting and are able to go out and be a part of the 
community.22 Finally the report talks about how these young women are also victims of 
violence, “Some young women are also victims of other forms of violence: sexual 
mutilation, polygamy, repudiation. The physical size of women does not always permit 
them to oppose this; on the basis of bilateral conventions, the law of the country of origin 
can apply to them, including clauses that are directly in conflict with equality between the 
sexes and with fundamental rights. Some marriages are forced in certain communities 
notably Turkish, North African, African, and Pakistani.”23 These accusations made by the 
commission against immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa, particularly the 
males. Despite making these accusations, the commission provides no statistics or 
evidence for these claims. It is unfortunate that the wording of the report makes it seem 
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that violence against women in France is a problem only among Muslim immigrants 
when it also occurs among non-immigrants in France.  
 The report also gives three different positions regarding the wearing of the veil 
that they encountered from their witnesses.  
• For those who wear it, the veil carries different significances. It 
can be a personal choice, or on the other hand a constraint, 
particularly intolerable to the younger women. Wearing the veil to 
school is a recent phenomenon. Affirmed in the Muslim world in 
December 1979 with the emergence of radical politico-religious 
movements, it manifested itself in France only toward the end of 
the 1980s.  
• For those who do not wear it, the significance of the Islamic veil is 
that it stigmatizes “the pubescent girl or the woman as solely 
responsible for masculine desire,” a vision that conflicts with the 
fundamental principle of equality between men and women. 
• For the scholastic community at large, wearing the veil is too often 
the source of conflicts, of divisions, and even of suffering. The 
visible character of a religious symbol is resented by many as 
contrary to the mission of the school which should be a neutral 
space and a place of awakening of the critical spirit. It is also a 
blow against the principles and values which the school should 
develop, especially equality between men and women. 24 
 
These positions on the veil are very much in line with the views the commission has 
espoused throughout the report. It views the veil, hijab, foulard or whichever term one 
prefers to use as something that is fundamentally at odds with the French schooling 
system.  
Finally the report ends with its own suggestions to the French government on how 
to deal with the veil situation in public schools. According to the commission, “after 
having listened to both sides, concludes that today it is not a question of freedom of 
conscience but of public order.” The suggestions that the commission gives to the 
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government reflects this viewpoint that there has been a shift in this issue from student’s 
freedom to express themselves in school to a matter of preserving the mission of French 
schools to uphold laicité. They put forward the following proposal, 
…the commission proposes inserting the following clause in the text of 
the law concerning secularity: “Out of respect for freedom of conscience 
and for the proper character of private educational institutions, clothing 
and symbols demonstrating a religious or political preference are 
forbidden in the schools, colleges, and high schools. Any sanction is 
proportioned and applied after the pupil has been asked to conform to his 
or her obligations” This resolution should be inseparable from the 
following exposition of motives: “The forbidden garments and religious 
signs are ostentatious signs, such as big cresses, a veil, or a yarmulke. Not 
looked at as symbols showing a religious membership are discreet 
symbols, for example medals, small crosses, stars of David, hands of 
Fatima, or small Korans.25  
 
After their proposal for public schools, the commission discussed the situation in 
universities, hospitals, businesses, prisons etc. and decided that in these institutions 
religious freedom did not interrupt any sort of learning process or public order. 
 Overall the findings and suggestions of the commission are not all that surprising. 
There has been a shift in public perception of the veil since the first incident in 1989 and 
the commission’s report reflects this change. The law that followed the report is almost 
exactly, word for word, the same as the commission’s proposal.  
  
 
The Law Itself 
As a direct result of the findings of the Stasi Commission, on March 15, 2004 the 
Loi n° 2004-228 du 15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le 
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port de signes ou de tenues manifestant une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, 
collèges et lycées publics (Law 2004-228 of March 15, 2004 concerning as an application 
of the principle of the separation of church and state, the wearing of symbols or garb 
which shows religious affiliation in public primary and secondary schools) was signed 
into law by Jacques Chirac. The specifics of the political process and viewpoints behind 
this law as well as domestic public reaction will be explored in Chapter 2. In this chapter 
only the specifics of the law and its applications will be examined.  
 The law itself was not terribly long, consisting of four articles. The first article 
sums up the law quite succinctly. “In public elementary, middle and high schools, the 
wearing of signs or clothing which conspicuously manifest students’ religious affiliations 
is prohibited. Disciplinary procedures to implement this rule will be preceded by a 
discussion with the student.”26 It is important to note that the law did proscribe that 
schools have a discussion with a student who they believed to be in violation of the law 
before taking any major disciplinary action. Another important aspect of the law is its 
explanation and definition of what constitutes “conspicuous.” “The clothing and religious 
signs prohibited are conspicuous signs such as a large cross, a veil, or a skullcap. Not 
regarded as signs indicating religious affiliation are discreet signs, which can be, for 
example, medallions, small crosses, stars of David, hands of Fatima, or small Korans.”27 
The way in which the law is worded makes its actual implementation seem very much up 
to individual school officials. Most school principles and their largest union, the 
SNPDEN (Syndicat national des personnels de direction de l’éductiaon nationale) 
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supported the law. They planned to take a “hard line” in its enforcements telling members 
that no student wearing religious dress was to enter a classroom or be able to wear 
religious dress during the prescribed “dialogue.” Another directive was to make sure the 
dialogue involved no one but the student and school officials in an attempt to keep 
“Muslim advocates” away from girls in school.28 In an effort by some schools to avoid 
distinguishing between religious and secular head coverings, they banned both.29 
 During the time period between the law being passed and its enforcement 
beginning (the first day of the 2004-2005 school year), some Muslim groups encouraged 
girls to defy the law and continue to dress how they wanted. One such group was the 
UOIF (Union des Organisations Islamiques de France) who issued a statement on June 
29, 2004, “urging Muslim pupils to show up for school ‘in the clothes they have decided 
to wear’ and offered its own interpretation of the law.”30 The Paris Mosque, on the other 
hand, actually encouraged Muslims to follow the new law.31 
 Events that took place just prior to the start of the school year in September 2004 
changed the response from groups on all sides of the law’s impending implementation. In 
Iraq, two French reporters had been taking hostage and their kidnappers demanded 
France repeal the law in order for the hostages to be released.32 This incident kept 
Muslim groups from actively encouraging girls to defy the law because they did not want 
to be seen as in agreement or associated with the hostage takers in France. Therefore the 
actual implementation of the law was quite anti-climatic. According to official French 
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statistics during the 2004-2005 school year, forty-seven students were expelled from 
school because they refused to remove religious symbols, 550 cases were resolved via the 
dialogue process and ninety-six students left the public school system to enroll in private 
schools, distance learning or enroll in another country.33 However there were some 
claims that this law caused several hundred girls not to attend school that year and they 
were left out of all official statistics.34 Despite all the hype and controversy surrounding 
the law, the actual implementation and enforcement caused little disruption to the school 
year.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 The focus of the previous chapter was the Stasi Commission, its report and the 
law that was passed as a result of the commission. This chapter will examine the politics 
behind the law banning conspicuous religious garb to be worn in French public schools as 
well as the domestic response to the law. What political and social changes allowed for 
such a law to be passed? When incidents involving hijabs in public schools arose 
throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s the Conseil d’Etat almost never ruled against 
girls wearing the hijab. Yet in 2003 when this issue was brought to national prominence 
again the French legislature easily passed a law that banned hijabs in schools. In order to 
understand the political climate that made the law’s passage possible it is important to 
start with the 2002 French election and the candidacy of the National Front’s Jean-Marie 
Le Pen against incumbent Jacque Chirac. It is also essential to understand the reaction 
that happened domestically after the law was passed to see that France is moving away 
from a civic/collectivist form of nationalism to a hybrid civic/collectivist/ethnic 
nationalism.  
 
The 2002 French Presidential Election: Le Pen Upsets Jospin 
 The first round of voting in the 2002 presidential election took place on April 21. 
Sixteen candidates were on the ballot for the first round but only three candidates were 
actually viable options to be the next head of the Fifth Republic. They were incumbent 
Jacque Chirac from the party Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic), 
Jean-Marie Le Pen from Front National (the National Front), and Lionel Jospin of Parti 
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Socialiste (Socialist Party). Most political analysts expected that Chirac and Jospin would 
move on to the second round of voting as they were from the two parties that traditionally 
won presidential elections. In fact most polls taken before voting began asked French 
citizens who they would vote for in the second round between Chirac and Jospin, 
assuming that Jospin was a shoe-in to face Chirac.1 Then in the twelve published polls 
prior to the first round of voting Jospin averaged eighteen percent which put him an 
average of 5.4 points ahead of Le Pen and every pole had Jospin beating Le Pen by at 
least four points.2 However, Le Pen edged Jospin out receiving 16.86% (vs. Jospin’s 
16.18%) of the vote to move on to the second round against Chirac, who received 19.88%, 
the rest of the vote went to the remaining thirteen candidates.3 France was absolutely 
shocked by the results. Le Monde wrote, “France is hurt, and many French people are 
humiliated.”4 Leaders from throughout Europe also expressed dismay and disbelief that 
Le Pen would be moving on in the election. Sweden’s Prime Minister Goran Persson told 
the BBC, “I hope that all democratic powers will unite against right-wing extremism and 
xenophobia.”5  
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 When the second round of voting occurred on May 5, 2002 it was one of the 
largest landslides in French election history. Chirac won with an overwhelming 82.21% 
of the vote, which equaled about 20 million more votes than Le Pen received.6 On the 
surface it might seem odd that a candidate who was able to finish second in the first 
round of the election would lose by so much in the final round. However, a better 
understanding of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his right wing National Front party sheds light 
on his surprising showing in the election and the changing culture of French politics and 
French nationalism in the post 9/11 era. While the French voters sent a message by voting 
for Chirac in such great numbers, Le Pen’s very presence in the second round of voting 
showed that there had been a shift in at least a portion of the population’s views regarding 
immigrants and Muslims in their country. Le Pen had finished fourth in the first round of 
voting in the previous two presidential elections that took place in 1988 and 1995. In 
1995 he received 15% of the vote in a field of nine.7 During the first round of the 1988 
election he received 14.38% of the vote out of nine candidates.8 For the first time since 
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1969 in a French presidential election there was no candidate from the left, instead the 
two candidates came from the center-right and the far right.9  
 
Le Pen and the National Front: The Far Right Wing in France 
 Who exactly is Jean-Marie Le Pen and how did his National Front pull of an 
improbable second place finish in the first round of the election? Jean-Marie Le Pen 
founded the National Front in 1972. Known for its extreme nationalist and racist views 
the National Front is notorious for its views involving immigration, particularly Muslim 
immigrants from former French colonies in North Africa. From the very beginning of the 
party, immigration has been seen as the most important issue to the National Front.  “In a 
press conference to mark the first anniversary of his party in September 1973, the FN 
[National Front] leader deemed France to be ‘at its limit in terms of immigration’ and 
warned of ‘much more serious racial tensions ahead’. He declared that ‘the French should 
come before others in France’, and that Algerian workers in France represented an army 
of ‘some fifty infantry divisions’ awaiting their order to mobilise.”10 The National Front, 
through its rhetoric, positioned itself as a party that believed immigrants were an 
unwanted part of French society and that the rights of those who are actually French must 
be protected above all others. They also felt that immigrants were the cause for the 
unemployment faced by French citizens. The National Front’s fifth national congress in 
1978 had very strong words when it came to immigration and unemployment: “It called 
for the ‘defence of the West’ and identified the ‘principal cause of unemployment’ in ‘the 
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massive presence of foreign workers on our soil’. This constituted ‘a danger of the 
security and health of our fellow country men, which, along with the drop in the national 
birth rate, could in time place at risk the very existence of our people’.” 11 Clearly there 
was going to be no reconciliation between immigrants and the National Front. They 
wanted France to be a country for the French and the French only.  
 Le Pen himself is one of the most polarizing and well-known figures in French 
politics. Jean-Marie Le Pen was born June 20, 1928 in the small costal town of Trinidad-
sur-Mer in Brittany. He was orphaned at the age of twelve when his father, a fisherman, 
died when his boat struck a mine. Le Pen was active in politics while a student and it was 
during the French war in Indochina, where he was serving as a second lieutenant in the 1st 
Foreign Parachute Battalion, that he became very active in right-wing politics.12 After 
holding various political and party appointments throughout the 1950s and 60s, Le Pen 
founded the National Front party.13 Le Pen was the head of the party until 2011 when his 
daughter Marine Le Pen took his place. 
  Le Pen is a frequent commentator in the French media spouting his frequently 
controversial views. Le Pen has been fined on numerous occasions by the French 
government for his public remarks. One such event occurred when in an interview with 
Le Monde magazine in 2003, he warned the French about the day when Muslims will 
outnumber non-Muslims in France, “the day in France when we have 25 million Muslims, 
not 5 million…The French will lower their heads and walk the sidewalk with their eyes 
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down. When they don’t do it, they’ll be asked, ‘what are you doing looking at me _ are 
you looking for a fight?’”14 This tirade led a Paris court to fine Le Pen €10,000 which at 
the time was equal to about $12,355.15 Another incident that put Le Pen in hot water 
occurred during the 2007 presidential election when on France 2, a television station, he 
had the following to say about Sarkozy’s Hungarian origins, “If I had become Hungarian, 
though I was of French origins, it would not occur to me to run for office as president of 
Hungary.”16 He then went on to say, “Being the head of state has a historical, spiritual 
dimension to it, it is not quite the same as being an ordinary politician. Mr. Sarkozy has 
said he is proud of his Hungarian origins, well I am proud of my French origins.”17 This 
is just another example of Le Pen’s anti-immigration mindset. 
 
Chirac and the Foulard 
 While Chirac easily defeated Le Pen in the election, the very fact that Le Pen had 
made it to the second round alerted Chirac that the vocal right wing had gained political 
clout. Perhaps this contributed to the fact that Chirac brought the issue of the hijab back 
to the national spotlight by creating the Stasi Commission after over a decade of the 
Conseil d’Etat ruling that girls were allowed to wear their hijabs in school. In a 2003 
public statement, Chirac spoke out against the veil, “Like it or not, wearing a veil is a 
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kind of aggression.”18 The newly reelected president knew that the tensions surrounding 
Arab immigrants, their religion and their very presence in France were risings and he had 
to do something to appease the right. Chirac was not alone in viewing the hijab as a 
national threat, “It is hard to imagine that a few schoolsgirls wearing headscarves could 
bring down the nation or even produce fractures in its foundation…Not only the president 
of the republic and most members of the Stasi commission, but many politicians, 
journalists, and public commentators, too, waxed apocalyptic on the issue of the 
headscarf and the future of France.”19 Throughout the duration of the Stasi Commission 
and the legislative process that created and passed the secularity law for public schools, 
Chirac never wavered in his opinion that the hijab was a danger to the republic.  
 
The French React 
 Throughout France, the reaction to the passage of the secularity law varied 
throughout the country. There were plenty of protests held around the country where 
Muslim women and their supporters took to the streets expressing their discontent with 
the law. In major French cities such as Paris, Lille and Marseille, Muslim women 
protested the hijab ban by shouting “Ni père, ni mari, le foulard on l’a choisi” (not our 
fathers, not our husbands, we choose the headscarf) and “Ni dupes ni soumises” (not 
forced nor downtrodden).20 One unintended consequence was the reaction that came from 
the Sikh community. Sikh men are required, as part of their religion, to not cut their hair 
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and keep it covered with a turban. The new secularity law would require male Sikh 
students to remove their turbans while at school. While the Sikh community in France is 
very small, only about 6,000 French citizens identify as part of the religion, it did not stop 
them from expressing their discontent with ban. In January 2004, around 3,000 Sikh men 
marched from the Place de la Republique in Paris to show their displeasure.21 
 In addition to protests among different religious communities, there were many 
debates in the French media arguing both for and against this new law and they came 
from a wide variety of backgrounds. Le Monde Diplomatique, the English language 
version of the daily Le Monde newspaper published two articles, each arguing a different 
side of the headscarf debate. French community activist Pierre Tévanian argued against 
the ban in his article “Say No to Racial Discrimination.” Tévanian takes issue with the 
way the media is portraying those who are against the ban. He objects to the media only 
showing hijab wearing women and religious leaders as those who object to the new law.22 
A number of other organizations also are against this new law banning religious objects 
in schools, including the Human Rights League, The Teachers’ League, the Movement 
against Racism and for Friendship between Peoples, and the main parent-teacher 
associations in France, the Unitary Union Federation and the Federation of Parents’ 
Committees.23 Tévanian also points out that all previous laws involving laicité and 
secularity in French schools were meant to apply to educators, those who worked in the 
schools, not the pupils. Another of Tévanian’s arguments is a common one among the 
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law’s opponents that this law would end up harming more young girls by ruining their 
chance at an education and would actually help networks of religious fundamentalists, “If 
fundamentalist groups are really organising some of the girls, the groups are not directly 
affected by the law - the girls will bear the brunt of it, leaving the men untouched. In fact 
- and worse - fundamentalists will gain from the law, since girl pupils barred from school 
will come under their exclusive influence. Religious groups will be able to exert even 
greater control, setting up Koranic schools and private tuition networks. Any expulsions 
will bolster their claims that Islam is the only true community and that the French 
republic rejects Muslims.”24 Tévanian concludes that instead of banning the hijab and 
other religious objects from the classroom, France should focus on real issues in the 
country such as social inequality, unemployment, racial discrimination and teacher 
shortages in schools.  
 Arguing for the new secularity law was Henri Peña-Ruiz, a lecturer at the Institut 
d’Études Politiques and a member of the Stasi Commission. While Tévanian focused his 
argument by looking at whether or not the rights of the girls wearing the hijabs have been 
violated, Peña-Ruiz focuses on the need to keep France a completely secular state. He 
argues the Stasi Commission showed the seriousness of the problems caused by hijabs 
and other religious items being worn in schools because some of those that testified in 
front of the commission did so privately because they felt that they were somehow in 
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danger for speaking out.25 A law enforcing secularity in schools would thus allow all 
students and teachers to feel safe in their schooling environment.  
Is it acceptable that, in "problem" suburbs, women are insulted and even 
attacked because they refuse to wear the hijab? Or that teachers are 
rejected because of their gender or what they teach (species in biology or 
the genocide of the Jews in history)? Or that the legitimate right to eat 
according to cultural custom can shift slowly into claims for single-
community tables in school canteens? This is no time for naivety. Some 
who support the wearing of religious signs, especially in school, are 
sincere, although ill informed about the requirements of schools. Others 
belong to organised groups that combine skillful rhetoric about freedom 
and tolerance in domains where they as yet have no power with threats 
backed by violence in districts where they hold sway.26 
 
In the mind of Peña-Ruiz, troubling a small minority to remove their hijabs in class 
provides far more benefits to the community and country as a whole. This law would 
restore secularity to France and help it to become the secular state it was always intended 
to be.  
 
Conclusion 
 The law concerning secularity in public schools was an incredibly controversial 
move by the French government. During the time of the Stasi commission and during the 
legislative process that ended up with the law’s passing, one could probably ask fifty 
different people from completely different cities and backgrounds and hear a multitude of 
different arguments both for and against the law. Despite the controversy surrounding it, 
the law passed with overwhelming majorities in both the National Assembly and the 
Senate. It seems that most French men and women regarded the threat of outsiders, 
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particularly Muslims, to the French way of life as extremely dangerous. Something had to 
be done to preserve the Frenchness of France. The successes of the political right during 
the 2002 presidential election created the environment for this law to be passed despite all 
protests and objections.  
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Conclusion 
 The hijab ban in French public schools, which was the main component of the law 
banning conspicuous religious items in public schools, was rooted in both the histories of 
French colonialism in North Africa as well as the shift to the right among French voters. 
By examining the Stasi Commission, the secularity law and the politics surrounding the 
law, several main conclusions can be made and will be discussed in this section. The first 
is that the rise of the political right and the increasing popularity of the National Front 
illustrate that immigrants, particularly Muslim immigrants, are often feared and viewed 
as a direct threat to the French way of life. Next is that the French government is 
addressing this fear by making legislation that directly affects Muslim girls and women, 
while providing ammunition for radical clerics to gain footing in French suburbs that are 
full of Muslims because they feel so discriminated against by the French and are 
susceptible to extremist views. Finally all of these laws, politics and rhetoric demonstrate 
that France is moving away form a civic form of nationalism toward one that is a hybrid 
between civic and ethnic nationalism. No longer can one subscribe to the ideas and goals 
of liberty, fraternity and equality to be French, now they must also be ethnically French 
to be treated equally and with respect in the French state.  
 As detailed in the previous chapter France and the world were shocked when 
Jean-Marie Le Pen edged out Lionel Jospin to take second in the first round of the 
election and move on to face Chirac in the second and final round of voting. Despite 
having run for president numerous times, Le Pen had never been considered by the media 
or the French political elite to be a viable candidate. The very ability of Le Pen to move 
on the in the election signified that things were changing in France. More and more 
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people were identifying with right wing politics. This created the perfect environment for 
Chirac to convene the Stasi Commission and pass the law that eventually banned hijabs 
and other religious symbols from public schools. However, the passage of this law was 
not an isolated event or a singular attempt to restore laicité to the republic. Instead it was 
a part of a larger set of events that demonstrated the fear of the French government and 
people regarding Muslims in their country especially after the events of 9/11.  
 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) regularly 
publishes reports on various European Union members and measures the amount of 
racism in the country, and the government’s response then they provide suggestions and 
guidelines for reducing incidents of racism. In the fourth such report done in France, 
published in 2010, the ECRI found several improvements from 2005 but also found many 
areas in which France was lacking. One of these areas was employment. The ERCI found 
that job applicants with names that suggested they were of North African, Sub-Saharan 
African and/or Muslim origin had a significantly harder time getting interviews from 
prospective employers, “ECRI expresses its concern at a number of reports and 
discrimination tests showing that the problem of discrimination on grounds of origin in 
the area of employment, particularly access to employments, remains significant and 
affects inter alia persons perceived as being of immigrant, North African or sub-Saharan 
African origin or of the Muslim religion. Some cases of racial discrimination in access to 
employment have been sanctioned by the courts, although the anti-racism NGOs consider 
that the penalties are not always sufficiently dissuasive, particularly where large 
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corporations are concerned.”1 The problem of discrimination with employment was 
backed up by a study done by Stanford professor David Laitin, University of California 
San Diego professor Claire Adida and Marie-Anne Valfort a professor at Paris I 
Panthéion Sorbonne University. In their study, they created three fake CVs, all with equal 
amounts of education and work experience, that they would send to different recruiting 
agencies and companies that were hiring for secretarial positions. The three women they 
created were Marie Diouf (Christian first name/Senegalese last name) who had worked 
for Secours Catholique, Khadija Diouf (Muslim first name/Senegalese last name) who 
had previously worked at Secours Islamique and Aurélie Ménard (typical French name 
with no religious connotation) who had worked for secular firms. They found that that 
when they sent Aurélie’s CV out with either Marie or Khadija’s that Aurélie had a similar 
rate of positive response 25% and 27% respectively.2 While Marie had a 21% positive 
response rate, Khadija only received positive responses from employers 8% of the time.3 
This shows clear evidence that the ERCI findings were true.  
 Access to equal and suitable housing is another area in which the ECRI found 
issues in France. In the third report published in 2005, the ECRI recommended that 
authorities combat discrimination based on race in the housing sector, however in 2010 
they found that the situation was nearly unchanged. The situation was particularly 
troubling when it came to housing applicants from North or Sub-Saharan Africa, 
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“Concerning private housing, for example, a testing operation conducted by the HALDE 
[High Authority for the Struggle Against Discrimination and for Equality] in 2006 in 
three regions showed that applicants of North African or Black African origin were nine 
times less likely to obtain the apartment being offered than the benchmark applicants.”4 
There seems to be a pattern of discrimination throughout France in several different 
sectors of society and there seems to be little that the French authorities are doing to 
change these issues.  
 The ERCI also found that despite no major incidents in public schools when the 
secularity law was passed, there have been many instances where the law’s application 
has been mistaken and Muslim women wearing a hijab outside of public elementary and 
secondary schools have been subjected to discrimination. Examples of this include 
women being asked to remove their headscarves by their employers, both in the public 
and private sector and women who wear a headscarf being asked to remove it before they 
can drop their children off at a public school.5 The secularity law does not apply in any of 
these circumstances as the law only applies to students in public schools. Thus the ECRI 
made a recommendation to French authorities regarding these issues, “ECRI recommends 
in particular that the French authorities carry out an information and awareness-raising 
campaign vis-à-vis public service employees and the majority population so as to prevent 
unlawful, discriminatory requests that Muslim women wearing the headscarf either 
remove it or refrain from entering a public place.”6 Yet, in the same year this report was 
published, a new law was passed in France banning women from wearing the niqab (full 
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face veil) in all public spaces. This new law shows that there is no initiative in France to 
stop discrimination against Muslims and Muslim women.  
 In July and September 2010, the French National Assembly and Senate passed a 
bill outlawing clothing that covers a person’s face in any public space.7 While the law did 
not specify any particular garments in the text, two of its biggest supporters implied that 
the law referred to particular forms of Muslim dress. French Justice Minister Michèle 
Alliot-Marie, the presenter of the bill, said these Muslim garments “amounts to being cut 
off from society and rejecting the very spirit of the French republic that is founded on a 
desire to live together.”8 The president of France, Nicolas Sarkozy made his views on the 
burqa and niqab quite clear when he said, “the burqa is not welcome in France because it 
is contrary to our values and contrary to the ideals we have of a woman’s dignity.”9 A 
majority of French citizens and politicians seemed to agree with the president and justice 
minister as the law easily passed both legislative houses and a poll done by the Pew 
Research Center found that eighty-two percent of French voters favored the ban.10 Yet 
just how many people will this law actually affect? In 2009 the Ministry of the Interior 
conducted a study that estimated that only 1900 women wore either the burqa or the 
niqab and 270 of these women lived in French territories overseas.11 In addition to the 
small percentage of the population that actual wear these garments, most aren’t recent 
immigrants, instead two-thirds of niqab and burqa wearers were of French nationality 
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including immigrants who had been in France for several generations.12 Thus this 
particular phenomenon of wearing the burqa or niqab is not really an immigrant problem.  
 There are several levels of punishment associated with the ban. Unlike the 
secularity law aimed at public schools which prescribed a dialogue with offending 
students and then eventually expulsion if the student still refused to comply with the law, 
this face veil ban came with monetary punishments. The bill put a maximum fine of €150 
per breach of the law and then if someone is forcing a woman to wear a face veil they 
receive a penalty up to €30,000 and a year in jail, this doubles if it involves a minor 
wearing a face veil.13 According to an article in the New York Times, the first fines 
issued from the ban came in September 2011 when two women, Hind Ahmas and Najate 
Nait Ali, in the city of Meaux were fined €120 and €80 respectively.14 The two women 
are in the process of appealing their fines. Although they were the first two that had been 
fined, according to the Interior Ministry 201 women had been stopped by the police since 
the law had taken effect in April 2011 and 159 had received citations.15  
 The most recent law affecting Muslims in France is a ban on praying in the street. 
On September 16, 2011, the ban went into effect; its purpose was to keep the overflow of 
people at Friday jumah from moving into the street to say their prayers. The largest 
French cities are finding that they do not have enough space in their mosques for all those 
that come for Friday prayer so many people are forced to pray in the streets. In an effort 
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to make the implementation as smooth as possible, Paris Muslims were given the use of 
fire barracks to accommodate all those who wanted to pray while a bigger mosque space 
was constructed. Sheik Mohammed Salah Hamza oversaw the prayer at these barracks 
and told Reuters, “It’s the beginning of a solution, the faithful are very pleased to be here. 
The space, which holds 2,000, is full.”16 However, not everyone was happy with the new 
law, in northern Paris several young men with beards, green headbands and banners 
gathered to try and discourage people from praying at the new site.17 While this particular 
law did not garner the same controversy as the hijab and niqab bans, many saw it as just 
another example of France’s intolerance to its Muslim population. Of course the National 
Front was in favor of this new law, party leader Marine Le Pen referred to the prayer as 
an invasion and accused Muslim fundamentalists of using prayer for political means.18 
 The secularity law that banned the hijab in public schools, along with bans on 
face veils, street prayer and an overall dismal report from the ECRI on racism and 
discrimination in France illustrates a dramatic shift in French society. This shift reflects a 
change in the type of nationalism present in France. Liah Greenfeld, a widely renowned 
expert on nationalism, wrote in 1995 that she believed that France combined civic and 
collectivist nationalism. One could easily argue that her assessment of France as a hybrid 
of these two types of nationalism is still true. The country plays tug-o-war between its 
motto of liberty, equality and fraternity and its own vision of what a French person 
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should look like. The latter, in particular, was highlighted by Nicolas Sarkozy’s 2009 
plan to define French identity by holding a series of town hall meetings to discuss the 
topic.19 However instead of defining a national French identity, the plan did little more 
than alienate immigrants even more and was widely considered a failure.20 
 Because of recent laws and the overall treatment of French Muslims and Muslim 
immigrants, one can add ethnic nationalism to the French civic/collectivist hybrid. France 
still retains characteristics of the civic and collectivist forms of nationalism. But being 
considered French is becoming more difficult with the passage of laws targeting Muslim 
women and Muslim prayer. It seems that for a Muslim to be considered French they must 
abandon certain religious and cultural traditions. Both their first and surnames 
immediately let others know that they are not of ethnic French or even 
European/Christian descent and that often affects their ability to find work and housing. 
With some of these laws concerning the Muslim population of France being passed as 
recently as late 2011, there seems to be no dialogue or movement to better the situation of 
integrating new Muslim immigrants into French society or helping those who have been 
in France for generations become fully fledged members of French society. If laws like 
the hijab ban and the niqab ban continue to be passed and groups like the National Front 
continue to spew their racist rhetoric, French Muslims will continue to be alienated and 
France will lose more and more of its civic nationalist identity.  
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